Institution Formation in Public Goods Games

Centralized sanctioning institutions are of utmost importance for overcoming free-riding tendencies and enforcing outcomes that maximize group welfare in social dilemma situations. However, little is known about how such institutions come into existence. In this paper we investigate, both theoretically and experimentally, the endogenous formation of institutions in a public goods game. Our theoretical analysis shows that players may form sanctioning institutions in equilibrium, including those where institutions govern only a subset of players. The experiment confirms that institutions are formed frequently as well as that institution formation has a positive impact on cooperation rates and group welfare. However, the data clearly reveal that players are unwilling to implement institutions in which some players have the opportunity to free ride. In sum, our results show that individuals are willing and able to create sanctioning institutions, but that the institution formation process is guided by behavioral principles not taken into account by standard theory.microeconomics ;

Institution Formation in Public Goods Games

Centralized sanctioning institutions are of utmost importance for overcoming free-riding tendencies and enforcing outcomes that maximize group welfare in social dilemma situations. However, little is known about how such institutions come into existence. In this paper we investigate, both theoretically and experimentally, the endogenous formation of institutions in a public goods game. Our theoretical analysis shows that players may form sanctioning institutions in equilibrium, including those where institutions govern only a subset of players. The experiment confirms that institutions are formed frequently as well as that institution formation has a positive impact on cooperation rates and group welfare. However, the data clearly reveal that players are unwilling to implement institutions in which some players have the opportunity to free ride. In sum, our results show that individuals are willing and able to create sanctioning institutions, but that the institution formation process is guided by behavioral principles not taken into account by standard theory.public goods, institutions, sanctions, cooperation

Key Readiness Indicators To Assess The Digital Level of Manufacturing SMEs

Abstract The assessment of the digital level is considered pivotal, for manufacturing companies including Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SME), at the outset of implementing Industry 4.0 solutions in their digital strategies. Several self-assessment tools exist measuring the digital readiness and maturity, returning the overall digital level of the companies. On the one hand, the application of such tools proved to be effective, as it enables companies to systematically reflect about their digital level, strengths and weaknesses as well as opportunities and challenges to consider prior to the implementation of Industry 4.0. On the other hand, particularly for SME facing higher challenges compared to large companies in the management of digital transformation, relying exclusively on the knowledge of their overall digital level may offer limited elements to strategically orient decision-making process in this field. The present study presents the methodology used to develop, within the framework of a self-assessment tailored to the requirements of SME, a set of Key Readiness Indicators (KRI), deepening the interpretation of the overall digital level of the companies in specific areas of interventions. The KRI focus on the digital readiness of companies in terms of strategy, technological requirements, awareness about digital trends, and competences of employees, to offer complementary information to ease the definition of strategies for technological implementation in SME. Besides the methodological approach employed, the study shows the distribution of KRI within a sample of manufacturing companies located in the Marche region (Italy) taking part to the proposed self-assessment. The emerging dynamics of the distribution of KRI according to varying company characteristics such as size, turnover and overall digital level will be presented and discussed, together with the main implications related to the use of KRI for strategic planning of Industry 4.0 in manufacturing companies

Restorative Justice in Children

SummaryAn important, and perhaps uniquely human, mechanism for maintaining cooperation against free riders is third-party punishment [1, 2]. Our closest living relatives, chimpanzees, will not punish third parties even though they will do so when personally affected [3]. Until recently, little attention has been paid to how punishment and a sense of justice develop in children. Children respond to norm violations [4]. They are more likely to share with a puppet that helped another individual as opposed to one who behaved harmfully, and they show a preference for seeing a harmful doll rather than a victim punished [5]. By 6 years of age, children will pay a cost to punish fictional and real peers [6–8], and the threat of punishment will lead preschoolers to behave more generously [9]. However, little is known about what motivates a sense of justice in children. We gave 3- and 5-year-old children—the youngest ages yet tested—the opportunity to remove items and prevent a puppet from gaining a reward for second- and third-party violations (experiment 1), and we gave 3-year-olds the opportunity to restore items (experiment 2). Children were as likely to engage in third-party interventions as they were when personally affected, yet they did not discriminate among the different sources of harm for the victim. When given a range of options, 3-year-olds chose restoration over removal. It appears that a sense of justice centered on harm caused to victims emerges early in childhood and highlights the value of third-party interventions for human cooperation

Gr\"obner Bases and Nullstellens\"atze for Graph-Coloring Ideals

We revisit a well-known family of polynomial ideals encoding the problem of graph-$k$-colorability. Our paper describes how the inherent combinatorial structure of the ideals implies several interesting algebraic properties. Specifically, we provide lower bounds on the difficulty of computing Gr\"obner bases and Nullstellensatz certificates for the coloring ideals of general graphs. For chordal graphs, however, we explicitly describe a Gr\"obner basis for the coloring ideal, and provide a polynomial-time algorithm.Comment: 16 page

Interoperability and Information Brokers in Public Safety: An Approach toward Seamless Emergency Communications

When a disaster occurs, the rapid gathering and sharing of crucial information among public safety agencies, emergency response units, and the public can save lives and reduce the scope of the problem; yet, this is seldom achieved. The lack of interoperability hinders effective collaboration across organizational and jurisdictional boundaries. In this article, we propose a general architecture for emergency communications that incorporates (1) an information broker, (2) events and event-driven processes, and (3) interoperability. This general architecture addresses the question of how an information broker can overcome obstacles, breach boundaries for seamless communication, and empower the public to become active participants in emergency communications. Our research is based on qualitative case studies on emergency communications, workshops with public safety agencies, and a comparative analysis of interoperability issues in the European public sector. This article features a conceptual approach toward proposing a way in which public safety agencies can achieve optimal interoperability and thereby enable seamless communication and crowdsourcing in emergency prevention and response